2015’s world is not the same as 2022’s. Since then, nations have made significant strides in preventing the worst effects of climate change: Canada has implemented a price on carbon emissions, Europe has adopted the Green Deal, and the United States managed to enact the Inflation Reduction Act. Furthermore, elected officials have run and won elections on similar ideas. The globe will probably not warm by 9 degrees Fahrenheit by the end of the century, as had previously been conceivable, because of a global shift away from coal power.
The likelihood of a climate war has not totally lessened after 2015. The hazards, however, have changed. There is now a danger that attempts to address climate change might incite conflict in and of themselves as more nations have incorporated the energy transition into their economy.
Trade disputes between the United States and China already revolve on disagreements over dual-use technology. The joe Biden administration essentially barred the sale of any contemporary semiconductor manufacturing machinery to China last month. Additionally, it prohibited “U.S. individuals,” a category that includes American citizens and those in possession of a green card, from working in the Chinese semiconductor business. The strategy, according to Eric Levitz in New York magazine, “is now official U.S. policy to prevent China from attaining its growth goals.” This amounts to a kind of economic warfare.
When you consider that semiconductors are essential for decarbonization, this is a risky line of reasoning: The transition to electricity practically demands increased usage of semiconductors. Almost every aspect of how electric vehicles, scooters, water heaters, induction stoves, and other devices utilise or conserve energy is controlled by computer chips. Making minor changes to the computer chips and software that control a car’s battery pack is one of the key ways electric-vehicle manufacturers gain a competitive edge. The semiconductors affected by Biden’s policies today are considerably more sophisticated than the less expensive variety required for decarbonization. However, it is clear how attempting to stop the other country’s growth might escalate an economic dispute into a military one.
Taiwan remains the most likely—and possibly the only—trigger for a full-scale conflict between China and the United States, but we should be aware of how trade disputes, even when they result from politicians’ noble aspirations for a domestic clean-tech sector, can deteriorate international relations and encourage zero-sum thinking. We should be clear that Americans, Chinese, or European citizens do not pose the biggest threat from violence motivated by mitigation. According to a recent article in The Wall Street Journal, the Democratic Republic of the Congo has lately experienced its worst rebel violence in ten years as rebels purportedly supported by Rwanda strive to capture the nation’s mineral resources. The highest tantalum deposits are found in Congo, which also generates two-thirds of the cobalt used in capacitors.
China continues to be dependent on imported natural gas and oil; the United States is now a significant and expanding natural gas exporter to China. The chances of a more serious conflict may increase significantly if the United States stopped exporting such goods, as it did with oil to Japan before to World War II.
Advocates for the environment have long urged that economic and social policies should be based on their concern. They said that climate is everything. They did succeed to a certain extent, since decarbonization is now central to how the United States, China, and Europe envision their economies’ futures. Advocates for the environment have gained a seat at the table where decisions about the survival of the state and society are made. What a long way we still have to go, despite how far the world has come.
